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GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS: PROCUREMENT
REGULATIONS TAKE ON FORCE OF LAW
Today the government contractor must cope with an astonish-
ing and almost intolerable imbroglio of regulations, directives, and
administrative practices, subject to constant growth and change.
Moreover, within the past twenty-five years approximately 5,000
court decisions, Board of Contract Appeals rulings, and Comp-
troller General opinions have been issued which have modified
this relatively new and specialized field of law. As this body of
law continues to grow its problems multiply and become increas-
ingly difficult to untangle.
Presently some of the contractor's worst problems stem from
an ambiguous but inveterate formulation, that "a regulation by
a department of government, addressed to and reasonably adapted
to the enforcement of an act of Congress, the administration of
which is confided to such department, has the force and effect of
law if it be not in conflict with express statutory provision."1 Re-
cent cases have reiterated this proposition, even overriding incon-
sistent state legislation.' While it is possible that the courts have
initiated a liberal trend toward giving federal regulations the force
and effect of law, this is extremely doubtful. It is more probable that
this vague concept (i.e., a regulation has the "force and effect of
law") has been freely used, and the courts have employed no precise
test to determine when the concept should be used. Some courts have
failed to foresee the possible detriment that this principle will im-
pose upon the government contractor and government agents, absent
a more meaningful definition.
G. L. Christian & Associates v. United States' is a recent
decision in which the "force of law" concept was utilized to de-
monstrate the binding and overriding power of a federal regula-
tion. In this case the Department of Army awarded a housing
project contract under the Capehart Act. Pursuant to the terms
of this contract the contractor began construction. Five months
after the contractor commenced this project, the contracting officer
for the government notified the contractor that the contract was
being "terminated for the convenience of the government." Since
the original contract did not contain a "Termination for Conven-
ience" clause, the contractor brought an action against the govern-
1 Maryland Casualty Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342, 349 (1919).
2 Paul v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 426 (1963); Public Util. Comm'n of Cali-
fornia v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958).
8 312 F.2d 418 (1963).
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ment on the ground that termination was a breach of contract.
He claimed not only damages for the cost of performance prior
to the termination but also damages for his anticipated profit.
The Court of Claims reversed the Commissioner's opinion."
It first pointed out that Armed Services Procurement Regulation'
Section 8.703 requires that the standard "Termination for Con-
venience of the Government" clause "shall" be inserted in this
type of fixed-price construction contract. The contract in Christian
did not contain this clause. But the court reasoned that since the
"Armed Services Procurement Regulations were issued under
statutory authority, those regulations, including 8.703 had the
force and effect of law," therefore "there was a legal requirement
that the plaintiff's contract contain the standard termination clause
and the contract must be read as if it did."' Thus, the contractor
could not recover for anticipated profits. He was limited to actual
damages as provided in the "Termination" clause incorporated
by the court into his contract.
REHEARING DENIED
More important and more provocative than the initial decision
of the Christian case is the rehearing opinion issued by the Court
of Claims in July, 1963. 7 At this time the court took the opportu-
nity, in a more illustrative manner, to reaffirm its prior holding that
the "Termination for Convenience" clause is "automatically" in-
cluded in armed services procurement contracts. The rehearing
opinion sets out a more accurate statement of the law and defines
more explicitly the court's basic rationale. At the same time, the
lengthy opinion rejects additional arguments forcefully presented
by the contractor's attorney.
The court first reiterates its basic proposition that "the Armed
Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR) required, as a matter
of law, the inclusion in the plaintiff's housing contract of the stand-
ard-form military article providing for the termination of con-
struction contracts for the convenience of the Government."18 The
court is implying that any regulations which are issued pursuant
4 Commissioner's Opinion, G. L. Christian & Associates v. United States, Ct.
C1.56-59, Dec. 22, 1961. The Commissioner found that termination by the Government
was in breach of contract, and awarded common-law damages.
5 32 C.F.R. §§ 1.100-30.5 (1961).
6 G. L. Christian & Associates v. United States, 312 F.2d 418, 424 (1963).
7 G. L. Christian & Associates v. United States, 320 F.2d 345 (Ct. Cl. 1963)
(rehearing denied). Since this article was completed, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari. 32 U.S.L. Week 3220 (U.S. Dec. 16, 1963).
s Id. at 347.
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to general statutory authority are as binding on private parties as
if Congress had enacted legislation to the same effect. Since ASPR
has statutory authority,9 it has "the force and effect of federal law."
The court rejects the contention of the contractor that the
the particular section of ASPR (Section 8.703) requiring termina-
tion clauses was promulgated without statutory authority and thus
"is bereft of the force of law."' ° The basis for the contractor's argu-
ment is that the Armed Services Procurement Act, which is the
principal statutory authority for ASPR, "did not expressly refer
to termination of military contracts."" The court answers that
general legislation such as the Armed Services Procurement Act,
which in broad terms empowers a government agency to make con-
tracts, "covers all phases of that process-from the solicitation of
bids or proposals, to the making of the contract, through its ad-
ministration and performance, to its completion or termination."' 2
Unless prohibited by Congress the government agency has author-
ity to contract and procure by all reasonable methods. To prove
that no conflict exists between ASPR's termination regulation and
the Armed Services Procurement Act, the court is quick to point
out that this Act "does not in any way prohibit or limit, expressly
or by implication, the use of clauses providing for termination of
a contract for the convenience of the Government. 3
Assuming that Section VIII of ASPR has statutory authority,
the court sees no reason why a regulation which has the "force
of law" cannot require that an article be incorporated into a con-
tract. For authority the court relies heavily on Paul v. United
States,14 in which "the Supreme Court has made it plain that validly
issued military procurement regulations have the full force and
effect of federal law." 5 In the Paul case the court stated that
federal regulations which require competitive bidding in govern-
ment procurement contracts have the "force of law." When there
is a "collision between the federal policy of negotiated prices [i.e.,
competitive pricing] and the state policy of regulated prices,""16
the latter must give way. In Paul the court held basically that a
9 Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, 10 U.S.C. 2301-2314 (1958). In the
initial decision, 312 F.2d at 424, n.8, and the rehearing opinion, 320 F.2d at 349, the
court indicates that the Armed Services Procurement Act, supra, is the principal
source of legislative authority for ASPR.
10 G. L. Christian & Associates v. United States, 320 F.2d 345, 347 (1963).
11 Ibid.
12 Id. at 348.
13 Id. at 349.
14 83 Sup. Ct. 426 (1963).
15 G. L. Christian & Associates v. United States, 320 F.2d 345, 347 (1963).
16 Paul v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 426 (1963).
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regulation issued under specific statutory authority is binding upon
the state. 1'7 Where such a regulation exists, it is immaterial whether
a state law directly interferes with a vital government function.
But, as will be seen, the court in Christian extends the power of
administrative regulations beyond the decision in the Paul case
and ignores a fundamental distinction between the two cases.
In Christian, as a general rationale for permitting a regula-
tion to incorporate a provision into a contract, the court indicates
that "it was important . . .and it is important . . . that pro-
curement policies set by higher authority not be avoided or evaded
(deliberately or negligently) by lesser officials, or by a concert
of contractor and contracting officer. To accept plaintiff's plea
that a regulation is powerless to incorporate a provision into a
new contract would be to hobble the very policies which the ap-
pointed rulemakers consider significant enough to call for a manda-
tory regulation."' Just as Congressional statutes govern government
contracts because of the need to guard legislative policy against
encroachment by the executive branch, "there is a comparable
need to protect the significant policies of superior administrators
from sapping by subordinates."' 9
The court's reasoning is noteworthy. Basic to our system
of government is that laws passed by Congress must be enforced.
Passing a law would be futile if subordinate executive officials
could sap it of its vitality. As the court states, there is a "compar-
able need" to protect administrative regulations from emascula-
tion.2° True as this may be, it is questionable that the court needed
to go as far as it did to protect ASPR from becoming ineffective.
The court could have decided the case without making such a
sweeping alteration of government contract law. Even if some
17 In Paul the court demonstrates that section III of ASPR requires in "un-
ambiguous terms" that "procurement shall be made on a competitive basis . .. ."
This requirement became effective pursuant to the passage of the Armed Services
Procurement Act of 1947, and was strengthened by a subsequent amendment to the
Act in 1962. "If there had been a desire to make federal procurement policy bow to
state price-fixing in face of the contrary policy expressed in the Regulation, [ASPR
section III] we can only believe that the objectives of the Act [Armed Services Pro-
curement Act] would have been differently stated." Paul v. United States, supra at
436. Thus, the court clearly infers that the 1947 Act as amended is the specific statu-
tory authority for ASPR section III.
18 G. L. Christian & Associates v. United States, 320 F.2d 345, 351 (1963).
19 Ibid.
20 It is interesting to note that the "sapping" in Christian was by an adminis-
trative "subordinate" who held the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Properties & Installations). Generally a contractor would feel secure if such a high
ranking official approved the contract. Upon rehearing the court dismissed this issue
and indicated there was a lack of "proof that this Assistant Secretary was em-
powered to approve alterations in articles mandatorily required by ASPR." 320 F.2d
at 353.
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change was desirable, the court should not have utilized a concept
which is bound to introduce further uncertaintly in an already
confused area of law. This article will critically review the doctrine
established by the Christian case.
POSSIBLE EXTENSION OF CHRISTIAN
Government contracts can be extremely complex documents.
The Dixon-Yates contract, for example, reads like a corporate
trust indenture. 1 These contracts are already complicated, and
it is unnecessary and undesirable to make them more so. But the
Christian case creates a new caveat for the contractor, compound-
ing his burdens. Under Christian, when a section of ASPR indicates
that a clause "shall" be inserted in the contract, this clause is
automatically incorporated into the contract. This occurs despite
the fact that it was the contracting officer who failed to include
the clause.
If Christian is followed, what will be its effect? From a
practical point of view, the effect of holding that contractual pro-
visions embodied in a regulation are binding on a private con-
tractor, whether included in his contract or not, will be chaotic.
If a government contract automatically incorporates provisions
of which neither the contracting officer nor the contractor is
aware, not subsequently consented to by the contractor, and not
the result of a mutual mistake, the contractor can never be cer-
tain of his rights and obligations. He is potentially subject to all
requirements of ASPR. He may even find himself bound by sup-
plemental regulations from the subordinate military agency with
which he is contracting. He will have the intolerable task of main-
taining an accurate awareness of the pertinent provisions and their
frequent changes in such regulations. At no point will the con-
tractor be certain whether a provision of the regulation is appli-
cable to his contract. For example, ASPR's controversial section
on Patents22 requires that every contract shall include the formal
Patent Rights (License) clause if the contract has "experimental,
developmental, or research work" as one of its purposes.23 What if
the contracting officer determines that a contract is not experi-
mental, etc., and fails to include this clause, but subsequently the
Department of Defense finds that the contracting officer was wrong?
When a dispute arises over patent rights, will the government now
21 Pasley, The Interpretation of Government Contracts: A Plea for Better Under-
standing, 25 FORDHAm L. REv. 211 (1956).
22 32 C.F.R. §§ 9.100-9.111 (1962).
23 Id. at § 9-107.2.
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be able to argue under Christian that such a clause has the force
and effect of law, and despite the subordinate's failure to include
it, the clause is automatically incorporated into the contract? If
this reasoning prevails, the government contract will become
meaningless, for in reality the contract will be found someplace
in the voluminous ASPR.
The Christian decision has already spurred vehement opposi-
tion.24 Besides the array of arguments set out in the rehearing,
another argument is that, even though Section 8.703 of ASPR
requires that a standard "Termination Clause" be included in
fixed-price contracts, it has not been the Comptroller General's
custom to enforce such a clause against the contractor unless it
has been specifically included in the contract,25 or a specific pro-
vision in the statute makes the regulation directly applicable to
the contract.2" Absent either of these conditions, the Comptroller
General has held that a regulation which requires the insertion
of a provision in a contract "is mandatory only on the contracting
officials, and in no way can be interpreted to bind a private con-
tractor directly."27
COMPOSITION OF ASPR
ASPR runs the gamut of requirements for government pro-
curement. It can best be described as the "how-to-do-it" bible
of the contracting officer. In its own context, the contents of ASPR
are "policies and procedures relating to the procurement of supplies
and services . . . designed to achieve maximum uniformity
throughout the Department of Defense."28 The first sections of
ASPR were drafted to implement the 1947 Armed Services Pro-
curement Act. They prescribe the manner in which the contracting
officer is to procure goods by formal advertising; and "when" and
"how" contracts are to be formed through negotiation; the special
methods to be used when the contracting officer is obtaining con-
24 See 51 GEO. L.J. 842, 850 (1963).
25 Dorris Motor Car Co. v. United States, 60 Ct. Cl. 68 (1924), aff'd, 271 U.S.
96 (1926); United States v. Speed, 75 U.S. 77 (1868).
26 De Laval Steam Turbine Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 61 (1931); Russell
Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514 (1923).
27 51 GEo. L.J. 842, 847 (1963). In the following cases the Comptroller General,
in an analysis of regulations required by the Davis-Bacon and Walsh-Healey Acts,
seemingly has ruled that mandatory conditions prescribed by these acts do not bind
the contractor unless specifically included in the contract: 20 Comp. Gen. 890 (1941) ;
20 Comp. Gen. 931 (1941); 40 Comp. Gen. 565 (1961); Comp. Gen. Dec. B-138242
(Jan. 2, 1959); Comp. Gen. Dec. B-144901 (April 10, 1961); Comp. Gen. Dec.
B-150173 (Jan. 11, 1963).
28 32 C.F.R. § 1-104.
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tracts for construction or research and development. Since May
1948 when ASPR went into effect, thirteen sections have been
added to the original four. They cover a highly diverse field of
subjects, from "Foreign Purchases" (section VI) to "Federal,
State, and Local Taxes" (section XI). In addition to the present
seventeen sections, ASPR provides that the Army, Navy, Air
Force, and the Defense Supply Agency may implement the regula-
tion by departmental procedures, directives, and administrative
practices which are not inconsistent with, nor repetitive of, the
regulations. These three branches of the armed services have their
respective sub-commands, e.g., procuring Bureaus and Offices,
which may issue operating instructions that in turn implement
the implementations. For example, the important Navy Bureau of
Supplies and Accounts Manual, Volume VI (Purchasing), pre-
scribes detailed procurement practices for the use of its field
purchasing officers; and thus is valuable as an operational guide.2"
The result of this successive implementation policy has produced
a maze of complex regulations which are often confusing and
sometimes contradictory. The contractor "is faced with a vast
source of procurement law and policy which is in constant change
because it is subject to so many influences. ' 0
MANDATORY DRECTIVES OF ASPR
Since Christian requires that an ASPR section has the "force
and effect of law," it is proper to ask: To whom are the mandatory
contractual provisions of this regulation directed? In other words,
does an objective perusal of ASPR viewed in its entirety demand
an imposition of its requirements on both contracting officers and
those who seek to enter into transactions with the government?
Official procurement textbooks published by the Army, Navy and
Air Force Departments"' seemingly do not demand an automatic
incorporation of every mandatory ASPR clause into a private
contract with the government. These departmental manuals pro-
vide that the "Boilerplate," or the "General and Additional Gen-
eral Provisions" of government procurement contracts "consist
of standard clauses designed to fit the majority of fixed-priced
contracts, including those contract clauses required by statute."82
What is significant is that each Armed Service textbook expressly
20 NAvY CONTRACT LAW § 12.10 (2d ed. 1959).
80 Alvis, Background and Current Government Contracting Trends, in GOVERN-
ElNrr CONTRACTS & PROCUREMENT 9 (1962).
81 D.A. PAM. 270153, PROCUREMENT LAW (1961); NAvY CONTRACT LAW (2d ed.
1959); AFM 110-9, PROCUREMENT LAW (1960).
82 NAvY CONTRACT LAW § 12.11 (2d ed. 1959).
[Vol. 4
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indicates that ASPR's "Termination for Convenience" clause is
"additional," and not required by statute.8 3 Both the Army and
Navy textbooks have identical sections which read: "Since no
statute makes the termination regulations in ASPR Section VIII
apply to contracts which do not expressly incorporate them by
reference or otherwise, the basic rights of the government and the
contractor upon termination must be found in the terms of the
contract itself. The whole termination system established by
ASPR Section VIII depends on the use in contracts of termina-
tion clauses provided in it or similar clauses."84 When the court
was confronted with this authority in the rehearing arguments,
it concluded that these textbooks simply mean that "since no
statute . . . [which] specifically covers the field of termination,
requires the inclusion of a termination-for-convenience article, and
prescribes termination procedures-the ASPR termination pro-
cedures must find their basis in a contractual termination article,
which can be incorporated in the contract 'by reference or other-
wise.' "' While the court believes that the textbooks are correct
in finding no "specific" statutory authority for incorporation of
a termination clause, it points out that the Act may provide "gen-
eral" authority which would allow such a clause to be incorporated.
Since previous decisions have unquestionably established that a
validly issued military procurement regulation has the "force and
effect of law," section 8.703 of ASPR requires that a termination
article be "included in plaintiff's contract and therefore it was
incorporated 'by reference or otherwise.' "'I The conclusion to be
drawn from the court's reasoning is that the textbook authors have
merely failed to acknowledge this "general" authority which
gives impetus to Section VIII of ASPR, or the court took this
opportunity to "re-write" the Army-Navy-Air Force textbooks
on government contracts and procurement to fit its own theory.
It is not a novel concept that a termination statute can re-
quire a clause to be "read into" a contract,3 7 making the right to
cancel one of the terms of the contract.38 But it is novel to allow
a regulation to incorporate a termination clause into a contract.
33 D.A. PAM. 27-153, PROCUREMENT LAW, p. 407 (1961); NAVY CONTRACT LAW
§ 5 (2d ed. 1959); AFM 110-9, PROCUREMENT LAW, chap. 9 (1960).
3 D.A. PAM. 27-153, PROCUREMENT LAW, p. 407 (1961); NAVY CONTRACT LAW
§ 5.29 (2d ed. 1959).
35 G. L. Christian & Associates v. United States, 320 F.2d 345, 349, 350 (1963).
36 Id. at 350.
37 De Laval Steam Turbine Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 61 (1931); Russell
Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514 (1923).
38 College Point Boat Corp. v. United States, 267 U.S. 12 (1924) ; Russell Motor
Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514 (1923).
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Yet the court fails to see "why this should be so when . . . mere
regulations can supersede state laws which would otherwise con-
trol; giving the regulation the status of law equates them fully
to federal legislation."8 The court cites Executive Order No. 9001
(implementing the First War Powers Act) as a "well-known"
example of such incorporation. But an executive order is not an
ASPR-type regulation, and no examples were cited where a pre-
existing regulation with only "general" authority was read into
a contract. Regulations with "specific" statutory authority receive
the impetus of law because they are aligned to the statute. For
example, the Armed Services Procurement Act states there must
be formal advertising in government procurement. 0 Pursuant to
this "specific" demand a regulation (ASPR section II) was com-
piled to implement the legislation. In comparison, the Defense
Department has implied authority as a governmental agency to
promulgate regulations at all echelons. This authority is "general."
The regulations issued under general authority may be of great
significance, e.g., ASPR's Termination for Convenience clause,
or minor significance, e.g., a requirement as to the weight and
texture of the paper used in writing government contracts. Chris-
tian stands for the proposition that "general" statutory authority
is sufficient to give all regulations within ASPR the "force and
effect of law."
Does an objective reading of ASPR as a "whole" lend credence
to the Christian approach? It is reasonable to suppose that Con-
gress intended the voluminous demands of ASPR to have the
"force of law"? In general "the ASPR was established with the
idea of being a concise statement of principles to guide Con-
tracting Officers in exercising the powers and judgment granted
to them by the Armed Services Procurement Act."' More specif-
ically, and pertinent to the Christian case, "the main function
of ASPR Section VIII is to explain the termination clauses and
to furnish guidance and direction to the contracting officer and
his representatives in taking action under the termination clause. 42
ASPR itself indicates that: "Each contracting officer is respons-
ible for perfoming or having performed all administrative actions
necessary for effective contracting. ' 48 The inference can be drawn
that ASPR was not written for the contractor. Instead, it was
89 G. L. Christian & Associates v. United States, 320 F.2d 345, 350 (1963).
40 10 U.S.C. § 2304 (1958).
41 Alvis, Background and Current Government Contracting Trends, in GovwRN-
MENT CONTRACTS & PROCUREMENT 8 (1962).
42 D.A. PAM. 27-153, PROCUREMENT LAW, p. 407 (1961); NAvY CONTRACT LAW
§ 5.29 (2d ed. 1959).
48 32 C.F.R. § 3-801.2.
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written as a general directive for the contracting officers. Despite
the fact that numerous sections of ASPR refer specifically to the
contractor, it would seem that it is not the contractor's task but
the contracting officer's duty to determine which of the numerous
clauses in ASPR are applicable to a contract. The contractor has
certain obligations during the procurement proceedings. But the
government executes the contract, and "the cardinal rule is that
the contract means exactly what it says. There are no hidden mean-
ings, no 'traps for the unwary,' no deliberate ambiguities.""
Under general contract principles, the contractor should be able
to determine his rights and obligations by looking to the contract.
This fundamental concept is especially important when dealing
with fixed-price contracts; here the court has held that the United
States is governed by the same rules as are private individuals."
Under the common law concept of contractual agreements, when
parties enter into a written contract, they manifest their intent
that this writing is a complete statement of their agreement and
"no evidence, oral or written, of prior understandings or negotia-
tions, are admissible to contradict or vary the written contract.146
The traditional method of determining the rights and obligations
under a contract is to look at the contract. The court's reasoning in
Christian not only demonstrates a complete departure from this
basic common law principle, but also is contrary to the prevailing
law involving government contracts. 7
FORCE OF LAW CONCEPT
In its initial determination of the controversy in the Chris-
tian case the court alluded to two basic notions regarding public
policy: (1) there has been a "deeply ingrained strand of public
procurement policy" disallowing the recovery of anticipated prof-
its by a contractor,4 and (2) "the Defense Department and the
Congress would be loath to sanction a large contract which did
not provide for power to terminate . . .41 The court concluded
that it "should not be slow to find the standard termination article
incorporated, as a matter of law, into plaintiff's contract.""0
Undoubtedly the court was disturbed by the facts in this case.
44 Pasley, The Interpretation of Government Contracts: A Plea for Better
Understanding, 25 FORDHrA L. REv. 211, 216 (1956).
45 United States v. A. Bentley & Sons Co., 293 Fed. 229 (1923).
46 SimpsoN, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 63 (1954). See also Boffinger v. Tuyes, 120
U.S. 198 (1887); Gilbert v. Moline Plow Co., 119 U.S. 491 (1886).
47 See 51 GEo. L.J. 842, 847, 848 (1963).
48 G. L. Christian & Associates v. United States, 312 F.2d 418, 426 (1963).
49 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
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The contractor was suing the government for more than five
million dollars in anticipated profits, after having completed less
than three per cent of the construction called for under its Cape-
hart Contract. Perhaps the court could have permitted termination
without "specific" statutory authority and without a provision in
the contract on the ground that public interest so required. 1 In-
stead, it chose to bestow on ASPR the "force and effect of law" on
the ground that it was issued pursuant to "general" statutory
authority.
Unfortunately, the Christian decision leaves the government
contractor (also the government lawyer) without a workable
test by which he can determine which regulations have the "force
and effect law." At best the contractor has such guide-lines as
the Paul case 2 which employed the "force of law" concept in a
rather surprising generalization. But, more important, the court
in Christian failed to see that "regulations are not all birds of a
feather. The genus contains several species and numerous varie-
ties. The several species differ in origin, function, and perform-
ance. M 3 Though the Supreme Court "has never provided a full-
bodied discussion of it,"54 most authorities recognize two dominant
species which are classified as "interpretative" and "legislative"
regulations (rules)." Space does not allow a thorough analysis
of this distinction, but we shall illustrate some of the distinctions
that the court might have made in lieu of the ambiguous generaliza-
tion that ASPR has the "force and effect of law."
Davis defines a legislative regulation as "the product of an
exercise of legislative power by an administrative agency, pur-
suant to a grant of legislative power by the legislative body. 5 6
If it is within the granted power, issued pursuant to proper pro-
cedure, and reasonable, this type of regulation is as binding upon
a court as a statute. On the other hand, interpretative regulations
are those "which do not rest upon a legislative grant of power
(whether explicit or inexplicit) to the agency to make law."57
The distinction between legislative and interpretative regulations
is important. The court may substitute its judgment as to the con-
51 United States v. Corliss Steam-Engine Co., 91 U.S. 321 (1875); 18 Comp.
Gen. 826 (1939) ; 29 Comp. Gen. 36 (1949) ; 22 Ops. Att'y Gen. 437 (1899).
52 Paul v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 426 (1963).
53 Lee, Legislative and Interpretive Regulations, 29 GEO. L.J. 1 (1940).
54 1 DAVIS, ADMrNISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.03 (1958).
55 Id. at §§ 5.01-5.11; Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 HARV
L. REV. 398, 400, 411 (1941); Feller, Addendum to the Regulation Problem, 54 HARv
L. REV. 1311, 1320 (1941).
56 1 DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.03 (1958).
57 Id. at § 5.11.
[Vol. 4
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
tent of an interpretative regulation, but it will usually not sub-
stitute its judgment as to the content of a legislative regulation.
Thus if the ultimate power to determine the content of the law
covered by the regulation is in the court, the regulation is inter-
pretative. But if Congress has granted law-making power to the
agency, and a regulation is issued pursuant to this authority, it
is legislative.
58
This does not mean that legislative regulations have the
force of law, while interpretative regulations do not. Sometimes
the latter do have the force of law, e.g., the Federal Tax Regula-
tions. If interpretative regulations meet certain prerequisites they
may have the force and effect of law: "(1) when the regulation
embodies a construction made contemporaneously with the enact-
ment of the statute, (2) when the regulation is of long standing,
and (3) when the statute has been re-enacted with the regulation
outstanding."59 As indicated in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,6" these
are the factors which give the regulations "power to persuade, if
lacking power to control." These are the highly crystalized circum-
stances which determine the degree of authoritative weight that
a court will give an interpretative regulation. Basically, however,
the interpretative type of administrative regulation will "inter-
pret the statute to guide that administrative agency in the per-
formance of its duties until directed otherwise by decision of the
courts."6 '
What is the law-making grant of power behind ASPR? Both
Paul and Christian indicate that the Armed Services Procurement
Act of 1947 is the principle source of statutory authority.2 This
Act, however, does not mention ASPR. Sections II and III of
ASPR coincide with the Act, but there is no specific provision in
this Act which provides an express delegation of power to the
Department of Defense (ASPR Committee) to issue regulations
which could be binding upon the courts. This does not mean
that there cannot be an implied delegation of such power, though
it does not seem reasonable that such implied authority would
be so broad as to cover the entire ASPR. The Christian case, how-
58 A clear illustration of a legislative regulation is the FCC's designation of a
uniform system of accounts for telephone companies, pursuant to a provision of the
Federal Communication Act that "the Commission may, in its discretion, presbribe
the forms of any and all accounts . . . ." American Telephone & Telegraph v. United
States, 299 U.S. 232 (1936).
59 1 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.05 (1958).
60 323 U.S. 134, 138 (1944).
61 Comptroller of Treasury v. M. E. Rockhill, Inc., 205 Md. 226, 234, 107 A.2d
93, 98 (1954).
62 See notes 9 & 17 supra.
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ever, holds that the "general" authority stemming from the Act is
sufficient as a law-making grant of power, applicable to all sections
of ASPR. Yet an examination of prior cases reveals that the Chris-
tian doctrine is not as well founded as the court indicates.
When the Supreme Court declared in Paul v. United States68
and Pubilc Utilities Commission v. United States 4 that certain
Army regulations "have the force of law," it referred to regula-
tions (ASPR Sections II and III) whose basic content is expressly
codified in the Armed Services Procurement Act. Probably these
regulations are what Davis calls legislative.65
What is the status of the remaining sections of ASPR? The
sections of ASPR which do not coincide with the Armed Services
Procurement Act come within the definition of interpretative reg-
ulations, i.e., they were not issued pursuant to a grant of law-
making power. It has been suggested above that an interpretative
regulation may have the force of law. But it must meet certain
prerequisites. Section VIII of ASPR (Termination for Conven-
ience) does not embody any of these aforementioned factors:
it was not created "contemporaneously" with a statute;"8 and, it
is not a regulation of "long standing";67 and, it was not "outstanding"
while its statutory basis was re-enacted. Thus it would seem that
the Christian case, in holding that ASPR Section VIII has the "force
and effect of law," promulgated a doctrine without foundation.
CONCLUSION
The real fallacy in Christian is that the court treats ASPR
as an indivisible entity. It fails to realize that certain ASPR sec-
63 83 Sup. Ct. 426 (1963).
64 35 U.S. 534 (1958).
65 See 1 DAvis, ADMINISTRATivE LAW TREATISE § 504 (1958). Davis indicates
that if the regulations referred to in Public Utilities Commission "had been inter-
pretative, the Court might have deemed them to lack the force of law." Even if all
ASPR sections were interpretative type regulations, there is a strong argument that
the section involved in Paul has the "force of law" because this regulation was "out-
standing" when the Armed Services Procurement Act was re-enacted. See note 17
supra. Thus it met an important prerequisite in Davis' test. See text accompanying note
59 supra.
66 The Code of Federal Regulations cites two statutes as authority for the
issuance of ASPR section VIII: 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1952) ; 10 U.S.C. § 2202 (1958). Both
of these enactments merely grant department heads the authority to make regulations
for the governing of departmental activities.
67 ASPR section VIII was first promulgated in January 1952. Though the con-
cept within this section is not of recent origin, United States v. Speed, 75 U.S. 77(1869), the use of section VIII in Christian is not indicative of an "established ad-
ministrative regulation" as set forth in Commissioner v. Estate of Sternberger, 348
U.S. 187 (1955).
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tions have specific statutory authority (at least by implication)
and others do not. In failing to make this distinction, and by
attributing the "force and effect of law" to ASPR in toto, the
court has created two unfortunate results. It places an onerous
and somewhat unjustified burden upon both the private contractor
and the government lawyer. Neither can be certain as to the con-
tent of their contract. Christian may become a "catch-all" author-
ity to bind the contractor to obligations that he never contemplated
at the time the contract was entered into.
Moreover it seems highly probable that Christian will ad-
versely affect the fundamental principles which the government em-
ploys to obtain a desirable contract. The government recognizes
that profit is the basic and essential motive to any business enter-
prise.68 In order to harness this motive to work toward more effi-
cient performance, the contracting agency offers the contractor a
stimulating high profit. This profit, however, will vary according
to the financial risk assumed by the contractor in performing,
i.e., the profit is tied to the contractor's efficiency in controlling
costs and meeting desired standards of performance, reliability,
quality, and delivery. To successfully harness the profit motive,
the government must negotiate contracts in which the contractor's
risks are identifiable. Contractors will be unwilling to compete
for contracts in which their risks are indeterminate.
If the contractor must risk the possibility of having any ASPR
clause automatically incorporated into his contract, as Christian
seems to permit, he will become skeptical and apprehensive about
dealing with the government. This creation of an indeterminate
risk for the contractor will militate against the profit motive
principle which the government is so laboriously trying to solidify
into a basic procurement policy.
Donald I. Eaton
68 For a complete discussion on the types of contracts used by the government
to harness the profit motive, see ASPR §§ 3-401 - 3-410.2.
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